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NEW DIRECTIONS IN CORPORATE LAW
COMMUNITARIANS, CONTRACTARIANS, AND THE
CRISIS IN CORPORATE LAW
DAvID MILLON*

I.

CRISIS

At a recent corporate law conference, I found myself seated beside a
young professor from one of the leading east coast law schools.' Referring
to the brochure advertising our symposium on "New Directions in Corporate
Law," which he had received in the mail, he recalled his surprise-and
incredulity-at the asserted existence of a "crisis in corporate law."' He
related that he had puzzled over this for a while and finally turned to a
faculty colleague for enlightenment. That person could not identify any
crisis either. So, one may ask, is there really a crisis in corporate law, or,
instead, is the title of this essay just a misleading marketing ploy?
We are in the midst of a crisis. It is a crisis of uncertainty over
corporate law's normative foundations. For much of this century, at least
* Associate Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University. A greatly abbreviated
version of this essay was presented orally at the New Directions in Corporate Law symposium

held at Washington and Lee University on November 5, 1993. For their comments and
suggestions on an earlier draft of the full text of this essay, the author is grateful to Lyman
Johnson, Bill Bratton, Denis Brion, Larry Mitchell, and Marleen O'Connor. There was some
talk at the symposium of a "Washington and Lee school of corporate law." In light of those

remarks, it is even more than usually incumbent on me to disclaim any intentions to speak in
this essay on behalf of anyone except myself.
1. This conference, on the American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance, was held at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law on October 15, 1993. The
conference centered on presentations of papers published in a symposium issue of the George
Washington Law Review (see 61 GEO. WAsH. L. REa. 871 (1993)), followed by brief remarks
by commentators.

1373

1374

WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW [Vol. 50:1373

since the publication of Berle and Means' classic in 1932,2 the orthodox
assumption has been that corporate law's objective is to develop legal
structures that will maximize shareholder wealth. This shareholder primacy
vision of corporate law therefore disregards claims of various nonshareholder
constituencies (including employees, creditors, customers, suppliers, and
communities in which firms operate) whose interests may be adversely
affected by managerial pursuit of shareholder welfare. Managerial accountability to shareholders is corporate law's central problem. Nonshareholder
interests, if entitled to any legal protection at all, are for other, noncorporate
law legal regimes.
To say that shareholder primacy has been corporate law's governing
norm is not to say that corporate law has succeeded to everyone's satisfaction
in achieving its shareholder welfare objective. To the contrary, the ongoing
theme in corporate law discourse has been the need to increase the accountability of management to the corporation's shareholders. Berle and Means
articulated this concern in their book, identifying the separation between
ownership and control as the source of the accountability problem. A
complete solution has proved elusive. For one thing, as economic theorists
have pointed out, the costs of delegation of managerial authority-so-called
agency costs-can never be eliminated entirely because at some point the
marginal costs of remedial measures exceed the marginal benefits.' More
importantly, legal doctrine has displayed a certain degree of ambivalence
on the accountability question. As with any difficult public policy problem,
there are countervailing considerations. Deference to managerial discretion
has been thought to have a value of its own, if for no other reason than
the recognition that courts, staffed by lawyers rather than professional
managers and sitting in an ex post posture, lack the expertise to make
sound judgments about business policy. 4 In addition, corporate law has
always understood-though usually only dimly-that truly relentless pursuit
of shareholder wealth maximization is inconsistent with actual business
practice and socially unacceptable in any event.' Even as these considerations
have mitigated against a wholehog commitment to shareholder wealth maximization, it is still clear that shareholder primacy has served as corporate
law's governing norm for much of this century. It is otherwise impossible
to understand corporate law's basic doctrinal structures (for example, shareholder voting rights and directors' fiduciary duties to shareholders) as well
as its academic discourse. 6

2. ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANs, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).

3. See Michael C. Jensen & William L. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fni. EcoN. 305 (1976).
4. This idea underlies the business judgment rule, which, of course, has the practical
effect of diluting managerial accountability to shareholders.
5. For example, this ambivalence is reflected in corporate law's statutory endorsement
of modest charitable giving. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(9) (1974) (1991 rep. vol.).
6. For example, the antimanagerialist critiques of scholars like Professors Cary, Brudney,
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The hostile takeover explosion of the 1980s initially held out the promise
of a final resolution of the accountability problem. An active market for
corporate control would create a mechanism for managerial discipline far
more formidable than the lax constraints of the voting rights and fiduciary
duty systems. The beauty of the hostile tender offer, of course, was that it
allowed the bidder to do an end run around target company management,
appealing directly to the shareholders with the enticement of a hefty premium
over current stock market price. The specter of a hostile tender offer would
prompt underperforming managers to do better; those who failed would be
replaced. Either way, shareholders would benefit.
The case for an unrestricted market for corporate control rested on the
traditional shareholder primacy principle.7 But now the claims of shareholders were being pressed in a new context, one that presented difficult,
politically troubling implications not previously encountered. In particular,
there arose a widespread perception that, however beneficial they might be
for shareholders, hostile takeovers imposed extensive, uncompensated costs
on various nonshareholder constituencies. Workers lost jobs and other
business relationships were disrupted, and local communities suffered further
ripple effects, sometimes severe, from plant closings. State courts therefore
refused to go along with the shareholder primacy agenda in this setting and
validated resistance by target company managers, at least under certain
circumstances. 8 And, as if that were not enough, state legislatures enacted
statutes that effectively insulated corporations from control transactions not
approved by target management. 9
Hostile takeovers, which seemed to promise so much for shareholders,
ended up raising serious doubts about the shareholder primacy norm that
was their strongest justification. Recent developments underscore this phenomenon. At last count, thirty states have passed statutes that allow
management to consider enumerated nonshareholder interests (in addition

and Eisenberg as well as the "corporate social responsbility" arguments of the 1970s rest on
an underlying assumption that shareholder welfare is corporate law's primary value.
7. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The ProperRole of a Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. Rnv. 1161 (1981); Daniel R.
Fischel, Efficient CapitalMarket Theory, the Marketfor CorporateControl,and the Regulation
of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEx. L. Ray. 1 (1978); Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach
to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STx. L. REv. 819
(1981). The inspirational antecedent was Henry G. Manne,' Mergers and the Market for
Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965).
8. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Moran
v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); TW Services, Inc. v. SWT Acquisition
Corp., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,334 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989).
For a discussion of the Delaware judiciary's vacillating commitment to shareholder primacy,
see Lyman Johnson, The Delawarefudiciary and the Meaning of CorporateLife and Corporate
Law, 68 Tax. L. Rav. 865 (1990).
9. See generally Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Missing the Point About State
Takeover Statutes, 87 MicH. L. Ray. 846 (1989). At the same time, Congress refused to
intervene on behalf of shareholders, despite repeated requests to do so.
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to those of shareholders) in corporate decisionmaking. 10 These new directors'
duty statutes typically are not limited to the takeover context." Equally
noteworthy are the Chancery and Supreme Court opinions in the Time
case.' 2 Despite an offer from Paramount that was clearly attractive to
Time's shareholders, the Delaware courts allowed Time's management to
pursue an alternative designed to preserve the integrity of the corporate
enterprise. Read generously, Time suggests that management may disregard
shareholder preferences for the sake of competing nonshareholder considerations. Today, hostile takeovers, though not extinct (Witness the recent
battle for Paramount itself), are rare. 3 Nevertheless, the underlying question
of the appropriate balance among shareholder and nonshareholder interests-which had lain largely dormant within corporate law for so longretains its urgency (especially as institutional investors increasingly press
their claims for heightened managerial diligence), 14 and can no longer be

resolved by a facile bow in the direction of shareholder primacy. For
significant numbers of businesspeople, lawmakers, and academics, that
response is insufficient. In these quarters, management ought to be empowered-and perhaps required-to take the interests of nonshareholders into
account.
The upshot of all this is that the longstanding shareholder primacy
norm is on very shaky ground. Nevertheless, the advocates for shareholder
interests have not abandoned the field. They have returned to the fray,
reinvigorated by recent developments in the corporate world. In particular,
institutional shareholders are flexing their considerable muscles, bringing to
bear public and behind-the-scenes pressure on the companies whose stock
they increasingly control. 5 The Securities and Exchange Commission, pursuing its usual single constituency agenda, recently revised its proxy rules
to encourage institutional shareholder activism, 16 and academic partisans are

10. See generally David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. Rav. 223 (1991).
11. Id.at 246.

12. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., [1989 Transfer IBinder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 94,514 (Del. Ch. 1989), aff'd, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990). For discussion, see
Lyman Johnson & David Millon, The Case Beyond Time, 45 Bus. LAW. 2105 (1990); David
Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DuiKE L.J. 201, 251-61.
13. The recent Delaware decisions involving QVC's hostile bid for Paramount seem to
be limited to the special case of a voluntary transfer of control to a merger partner controlled
by a single person. Such transfers, the courts have held, generate a Revlon auction duty. See
Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 98,000 (Del. 1993).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 15-17.
15. See ROBERT A.G. MoNxs & NELL Minow, PowER AND ACCOUNTABmrY 230-38
(1991); Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. Ry. 520, 570-75
(1990); John Pound, Beyond Takeovers: Politics Comes to Corporate Control, HARv. Bus.
REv., Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 83; Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of
InstitutionalShareholder Activism, 79 GEo. L.J. 445, 478-90 (1991).
16. Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, Exchange Act Release No.
31,326, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,051 (Oct. 16, 1992).

19931

CRISIS IN CORPORATE LAW

1377

advocating further reform.17 All of this is aimed at making it easier for
institutional investors to play an active role in corporate governance. In
contrast to the small individual investor, for whom passivity is rational,
these large, illiquid ownership stakes provide the incentives as well asthe
means to get involved. The possibility of effective shareholder control seems
to promise a revolution in corporate governance no less startling than the
emergence into plain view of nonshareholder considerations. By closing the
separation between ownership and control, the accountability problem may
be solved once and for all.
Here then is our crisis. An exuberant, apparently realizable pro-shareholder agenda seeks to breathe new life into the shareholder primacy ideal
and generates ardent support. Elsewhere, advocates of nonshareholder interests press competing claims that are being taken seriously. In these circles,
the shareholder primacy model has exhausted its usefulness. These two
positions point in opposite directions. '8 Each commands substantial respect,
in law schools and in the "real world." These differences -ultimately rest
on strongly conflicting political visions of the appropriate foundations of
corporate law. When these visions are exposed, the depth of the disagreement
is readily understandable. The rift is deep and likely to persist.
II.

CONTRACTARIANS AND COMIUNITARIANS

A.

Legal Theory

Today's advocates of the shareholder primacy position-including the
current focus on institutional investor activism-rely on a "contractarian,"
antiregulatory, individualistic stance. 19 Proponents argue against corporate

17. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Next Steps in Proxy Reform, 18 J.CoP. -L.1 (1992).
Professor Black also argues that further federal securities law reforms, beyond. revision of the
proxy rules, would further facilitate institutional investor activism. See Bernard S. Black, Next
Steps in Corporate Governance Reform: 13(d) Rules and Control Person Liability, in MODERNImNo U.S. SEcusru-rs REGOUI.LoN: ECoNOMIC AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 225 (Kenneth Lehn
& Robert Kamphuis, Jr. eds., 1992). For a cautionary perspective on institutional investor
power, see Allen D. Boyer, Activist Shareholders, Corporate Directors, and Institutional
Investment: Some Lessons from the Robber Barons, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 977 (1993)
(noting potential for abuse when corporate ownership and control are joined).
18. Although they seem to oppose each other in the current American context, the
conflict between activist, self-interested institutional share ownership and responsiveness to
nonshareholder interests is not necessarily wholly irresolvable. In Germany, for example, large
banks own substantial blocks in major corporations, but the legal and business cultures seem
more accommodating toward worker interests. A similar point might be made about Japan.
In other words, the politics of corporate governance questions are more or less context-specific.
Marleen O'Connor reminded me of this point.
19. The leading academic proponents of the contractarian view have been Judge Frank
Easterbrook and Professor Daniel Fischel. See generally FRANK H. EASTEROOK & DANiEL
R. FISCHEL, THE EcoNotnc STRucTuRE oF CoRPoRATE LAW (1991). For a concise overview,

see Henry N. Butler, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation; 11 GEo. MASON L. Ray.
100 (1989). For critical appraisal, see William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of
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law rules that mandate or inhibit particular governance relationships. They
would instead leave it up to the various participants in corporate activity
to specify their respective rights and obligations through contract. According
to this view, state corporate law provides the terms of the contract by which
shareholders purchase management's undivided loyalty to their welfare. The

key term is management's fiduciary duty to direct the corporation so as to
maximize shareholder wealth. This mandate must necessarily be general and
open-ended, because detailed ex ante specification of how management
should act in running the business is simply not realistically possible. In
contrast, to the extent that management's pursuit of shareholder welfare

threatens nonshareholder interests, workers, creditors, and other affected
nonshareholders are free to bargain with shareholders (through their agents)
for whatever protections they are willing to pay for. This view assumes that
feasible (that is, not excessively costly) contracting strategies exist for.
correction of the harmful external effects of shareholder/management activity and, perhaps, that such effects are relatively uncommon. The contractarian view thus rests on a descriptive assessment of current possibilities,
as well as a normative vision of the limited role that law should play in
relation to individual economic activity.
In contrast to contractarians, "communitarians ' ' 20 more readily look to
legal rules to structure relations among the corporation's diverse constituent
groups, believing that corporate law must confront the harmful effects on
nonshareholder constituencies of managerial pursuit of shareholder wealth

the Firm: Critical Perspectivesfrom History, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1471 (1989); William W.
Bratton, Jr., The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation:A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNEL. L.
REV. 407 (1989). Contractarians differ among themselves as to the appropriate level of legal
regulation indicated by a contractarian premise. Some, like Easterbrook and Fischel, would
tolerate a relatively substantial body of mandatory rules in order to counteract market failure.
For discussion of this point, see William W. Bratton, Jr., The Economic Structure of the
Post-ContractualCorporation,87 Nw. L. Rav. 180, 191-97 (1992). Others, in contrast, appear
to be opposed to any sort of regulation that interferes with private ordering through contract.
See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, The Mandatory Nature of the ALI Code, 61 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 984 (1993).
It should be noted that contractarianism as a general approach to political theory may
have quite different normative implications from those of its current corporate law variant.
In the hands of Rawls, for example, contractarianism can yield arguments that resonate
strongly with the rights-based views of corporate law communitarians. For an overview of
contractarianism as an approach to political theory, see Kim L. Scheppele & Jeremy Waldron,
ContractarianMethods in Political and Legal Evaluation, 3 YALE J.L. & HUMANrrms 195
(1991).
20. This term has been used to characterize those of us who are critical of the contractarian position. See Michael E. DeBow & Dwight R. Lee, Shareholders, Nonshareholdersand
CorporateLaw: Communitarianismand Resource Allocation, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 393 (1993).
In accepting the characterization, I would emphasize that antiliberal connotations are not
intended. In other words, for reasons that I hope emerge clearly below, it is possible to retain
a commitment to the moral value of individual autonomy and choice while nevertheless
rejecting the market as a sufficient solution to all social problems.
For a bibliography of recent corporate law scholarship in a communitarian vein, see
infra bibliography accompanying note 47.
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maximization. For example, a plant closing may serve the interests of
shareholders while imposing substantial uncompensated costs on laid-off
workers and on a local community that has made infrastructure investments
in the expectation of a continued corporate presence. Or, bondholders may
find themselves holding riskier investments due to corporate releveraging.
Communitarians are skeptical about the practical efficacy of contract as a
mechanism by which nonshareholders can protect themselves ex ante from
these sorts of harmful effects. Particular kinds of harmful conduct may be
difficult for nonshareholders to foresee and specify adequately, because of
management's informational advantages and also because of the endless
change and innovation in corporate activity that a market economy demands.
Coordination of bargaining efforts among similarly situated nonshareholder
constituencies may also present costly practical difficulties. Accordingly, one
way in which communitarians differ from contractarians is in their greater
willingness to use legal intervention to overcome the transaction costs and
market failures that impede self-protection through contract.
Communitarians also differ from contractarians in emphasizing the
broad social effects of corporate activity. Contractarians tend to focus on
the corporation's internal relationships, applying a cost-benefit analysis to
a relatively narrow range of more or less readily monetizable interests.
Communitarians see corporations as more than just agglomerations of
private contracts; they are powerful institutions whose conduct has substantial public implications. Thus, for example, assessing the cost of the reorganization of a corporation like Time is not just a matter of adding up
possible costs in worker layoffs and potential gains to Time shareholders.
It is also necessary to take into account the general public's possible interest
in the various publications' continued editorial independence. 2' Even within
the corporation's boundaries, communitarians tend to understand social cost
more capaciously. For example, the laid-off worker who is able to find a
replacement job at the same wage may nevertheless suffer from a sense of
insecurity that was not there previously. So too may the worker who escaped
layoff. Contractarians tend to disregard less readily measurable morale costs
like these in making their welfare calculations. 22 Greater sensitivity to the
social costs of shareholder wealth maximization further encourages com21. Of course, there is room for disagreement over the value of Time's products, but
this was the point of the "Time Culture" argument made in the litigation over Paramount's
unsuccessful takeover attempt. See Millon, supra note 12, at 256-57.
22. Similarly, the cost of a lost job in one place would not necessarily be offset by a
new employment opportunity for someone else in another locality. Compare Professor Macey's
argument that nonshareholder losses need not be factored in when assessing the welfare
implications of a hostile takeover. Even in those cases (rare in his opinion) in which jobs are
lost in one locality, workers elsewhere will find new employment, so "overall national
employment is unaffected." See Jonathan R. Macey, State Anti-Takeover Legislation and the
National Economy, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 467, 478-79. Even if this assertion were true, it fails
to take into account the possibility that the welfare loss might still be greater than the gain,
depending on the relative values of the jobs in question. It also ignores the various negative
effects on worker morale of heightened insecurity generated by an unstable economy.
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munitarians to regard regulation in the public interest as appropriate.
Problems appear much larger, and contract all the more ineffective as a
practical solution. From this perspective, the contractarian view of the
corporation has too narrow a focus, and its response to the problem of
social cost is far too simplistic.
Despite the typical hostility of the contractarian stance toward claims
of nonshareholders for legal protection, it should be noted that a contractbased approach to the definition of entitlements can be used to generate
progressive (that is, nonshareholder protection) arguments. Legal scholars
have recently drawn on research by labor economists that models expectations of deferred compensation and long-term employment as implicit understandings in actual labor contracts.23 Although such understandings are
unenforceable under current contract doctrine, they provide a theoretical
foundation for otherwise vaguely grounded assertions of a right to job
security. For progressive contractarians, these understandings could be enforced judicially or might be incorporated into a reconstituted conception
of management's fiduciary obligations. However, the strength of this approach-its foundation in actual contracting practices and understandingsis also its weakness. Management can readily preclude claims of reliance on
implicit understandings, by means of explicit disclaimer in an employee
handbook, for example. 24 Further, the economists' elegant "life cycle earnings" model25 translates imperfectly at best into a sufficiently determinate
legal standard for particular cases. Judicial sympathy more than anything
else may determine outcomes. In any event, the disparities in bargaining
power that workers bring with them to the labor market shape the outcomes
of the bargaining process. Contract-based approaches to nonshareholder
protection therefore take for granted the existing distribution of wealth. As
a vehicle for nonshareholder protection, the value of progressive contractarianism must ultimately turn on an assessment of the efficacy of bargaining
as a means for self-protection. As discussed below, it is not at all clear
why protection ought to depend entirely on bargaining power. 26 From a

23. See Marleen A. O'Connor, Restructuring 'the Corporation's Nexus of Contracts:
Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REv. 1189 (1991);
Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Employees as Stakeholders Under State N'onshareholder Constituency Statutes, 21 STETSON L. REv. 45 (1991). Professor Coffee previously used implicit
contract analysis to make a case for legal protection of mid-level managerial employees. John
C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 Mic.
L. REv. 1 (1986).
24. The same strategy could also be used to defeat reliance-based arguffients that do not
depend on implicit labor contract analysis. For one such argument, see Joseph W. Singer, The
Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REv. 614 (1988).
25. See Stone, supra note 23, at 50 (including graph showing relationship over time
among actual wage, opportunity wage, and value of marginal product).
26. Professor Daniels' alternative progressive contractarian approach-that would ground
protection on hypothetical rather than implicit contract-is superior to the latter in attempting
to move beyond actual bargain to intervention based on fairness grounds. See Ronald Daniels,
Stakeholders and Takeovers: Can ContractarianismBe Compassionate?, 43 U. TOR. L.J. 315
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communitarian perspective, even these well-intentioned contractarian argu-

ments are problematic. 27
Communitarian skepticism about the efficacy of contract is not allencompassing, however. Just as a contractarian perspective can be turned

to progressive ends, it should also be clear that a communitarian stance in
corporate law does not result in a monolithic approach to concrete issues.
Communitarians may disagree among themselves about the strength of
claims of certain nonshareholder constituencies for legal intervention. For
example, some might accept arguments to the effect that bondholders can
effectively take care of themselves.2 In other words, one can recognize that
legal protections may be needed in some settings but not others. Having
said that, however, what does set communitarians apart from contractarians
is the communitarians' strong skepticism toward the baseline presumption
that contract alone should specify the terms of corporate governance relationships.
B. Ideological Differences
So far, the dispute between contractarians and communitarians (and
also the differences within each camp) may appear to be nothing more than
(1993). However, as with the implicit contract approach, such efforts can be defeated ex ante
by management disclaimer, and the almost total lack of substantive content of this approach
leaves nonshareholders even more at the mercy of judicial good will. As an effort to use the
rhetoric of consent to avoid the messy political choices and value judgments that communitarianism acknowledges to be unavoidable, a hypothetical contract approach tries to have it
both ways but seems doomed to failure.
27. Some might object that the dichotomy between communitarians and progressive
contractarians is too starkly stated. It is not always easy to say whether particular scholars
advocating various sorts of legal protections for nonshareholders come to their position from
a communtarian angle or from what I have termed a progressive contractarian one. This is
because even arguments for legal intervention couched in terms of "fairness" (rather than
efficiency) often seem to rest on claims about actual expectations (even if only implicit) existing
in bargained-for relationships. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 24. Likewise, arguments couched
in terms of contract may actually be about fairness in a noncontractual sense. See Daniels,
supra note 26. In other words, questions of entitlement often tend to get talked about in
terms of bargain, rather than in terms of rights that exist prior to actual market relationships.
Even so, I still think it is useful to focus attention on the extent to which contract and consent
(even if only implicit or hypothetical) are deemed to be the sole determinant of rights and
duties. Communitarians may occasionally seem to talk the language of contract for reasons
of convenience or habit, or because current legal scholarship lacks a widely accepted vocabulary
for discussion of non-contractarian sources of rights. Or, as discussed below, communltarians
may deem contract sufficient in some settings, but refuse to accept it as a totalizing positive
or normative model for all social relations. I discuss this deeper-level division at greater length
below.
28. Professor Bratton concedes that bondholder rights should be a creature of contract
but argues that courts should interpret contract terms generously. See William W. Bratton,
Jr., CorporateDebt Relationships: Legal Theory in a Time of Restructuring, 1989 DuYE L.J.
92; William W. Bratton, Jr., The Interpretation of Contracts Governing Corporate Debt
Relationships, 5 CARiozo L. Rav. 371 (1984); see also Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and
Stockholders, 13 J. Coap. L. 205 (1988). For a forthrightly communitarian approach to
bondholder protection, see Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Fairness Rights of Corporate Bondholders, 65 N.Y.U. L. R-v. 1165 (1990).
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a fairly technical dispute over the pervasiveness of externalities and the
efficacy of the market as a means for achieving efficient outcomes despite
transaction costs. One might interpret the communitarian critique as nothing
more than a rejection of the contractarians' normative, position (antiregulation) on the ground that their positive premise (that contract is generally
a sufficient vehicle for nonshareholder protection) is invalid. However, I
think the debate actually rests on a much more fundamental disagreement.
What is at stake is a profound difference in normative world view. This
ideological difference defines the basic divide between communitarians and
contractarians. It explains why corporate law communitarians and contractarians typically seem unable to take each other seriously.
In roughly sketching these contrasting perspectives, I want to emphasize
that I am trying to describe sharply differing ideological predispositions
rather than a rigid set of beliefs subscribed to by every contractarian or
communitarian. The risk is useless caricature. The hope is that the effort
may help partisans of both camps to see more clearly the typically unarticulated normative assumptions that underlie the current corporate law crisis.
Contractarians start from the presumption that people ought to be free
to make their own choices about how to live their lives (subject to an
overriding duty not to harm others). Legal rules that redistribute wealth,
mandate particular forms of behavior, or prevent people from making
bargains they would otherwise choose to make are presumptively objectionable because they interfere with people's ability to live their own lives
according to their own preferences, structuring their relationships with others
and defining their duties toward them by means of consent. 29 This idea
focuses on the individual as an autonomous being and is based on a
particular vision of human liberty as freedom from external, unconsentedto restraint. Contractarians are willing to admit the legitimacy of certain
mandatory rules, but such restraints on individual liberty must themselves
be justified in terms of the liberty interests of those who may be harmed
by the conduct restrained.
Communitarians approach these questions from a different perspective.
Their view of society contrasts sharply with the contractarians' animating
vision, emphasizing the social arena in which individual activity occurs.
Simply by virtue of membership in a shared community, individuals owe
obligations to each other that exist independently of contract. We are born
into civil society and thereby inherit the benefits of life in a community.
The value of those benefits depends in large part on the quality of the
social environment. That in turn is determined by the behavior of one's
fellow citizens, which is largely a matter of their values and goals. If we
are to discharge our obligation to preserve and strengthen the social fabric
that is our heritage, we cannot ignore those aspects of the material and
cultural landscape that shape those values and goals. Acknowledging our
interdependence, we must recognize our responsibility for the quality of the
29. See

MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962).

19931

CRISIS IN CORPORATE LAW

1383

lives of all community
members. The state acts appropriately when it
30
enforces such duties.
State action of this sort necessarily involves restrictions on freedom.
Nevertheless, the communitarian idea is also based on a vision of liberty,
but it is one that includes a positive component. 31 Liberty is empty without
taking into account those primary needs upon which adequate conceptions
of individual dignity and human flourishing depend. Basic physical comforts,
facilities for intellectual and emotional growth, and enriching social environments are necessary if individuals are to have meaningful opportunities
to define and pursue their own life-plans and to participate with civility in
a community of interdependence. Many communitarians, including the
corporate law communitarians referred to in this essay, share the contractarians' commitment to individual autonomy and choice as foundational
moral values, but they insist that meaningful choice requires a social
framework that cannot itself be constructed entirely out of private, bilateral
transactions. The market alone cannot adequately fulfill basic human needs
for everyone because many people lack the resources to participate effectively
in the market.3 2 Insistence on the market's sufficiency for the sake of
individual liberty therefore ignores those civic obligations that flow from
the social aspect of human existence. To communitarians, life chances should
not depend entirely on accidents of birth and bargaining power: people are
entitled to more out of life than what they can pay for.
C. Defining the Scope of ShareholderProperty Rights
In the corporate law context, contractarians characterize the debate as
a disagreement over whether it is appropriate to use mandatory rules to
impede shareholder wealth maximization in order to benefit other corporate
constituent- groups or other affected interests outside the corporate enterprise. For contractarians, such rules represent an unjust imposition on the
liberty of shareholders to pursue their own interests. They have made this
point by criticizing communitarian corporate law reform as the reallocation

30. One way to think about this contrast in perspective is the difference between some
economists' tendency to dissolve all social institutions into nothing more than a tangle of
selfishly motivated bilateral exchanges and sociologists' sensitivity to the complex, richly
textured, cultural embeddedness of mutual responsibility. For a thoughtful discussion of this
difference in worldview and its implications for corporate law, see Lyman Johnson, Individual
and Collective Sovereignty in the CorporateEnterprise, 92 CoLum. L. REv. 2215 (1992).
31. For a discussion of the distinction between negative and positive conceptions of
liberty, see IsAuH BERiUN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS oN LIBERTY 118 (1969).
Compare Rawls' distinction between the value of equality of liberty for all and differences in
the worth of liberty among various individuals depending upon their life circumstances. JoHN
RAWLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 204-05 (1971).

32. Accordingly, an individual's failure to succeed in the market does not necessarily
absolve the rest of society from regard for that person. In other words, communitarians reject
the Social Darwinist notion that failure is a matter of dessert, and societal disregard justified
by larger social values.
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or transfer of wealth from shareholders to nonshareholders.33 The wealth
reallocation assertion rests on the fact that, under current corporate law,
shareholders are for the most part entitled to pursue their own'financial
advantages without regard for possible harms to nonshareholders, unless
they have agreed to restrictions on that freedom. For example, unless
workers have bargained and paid for relevant protections, they may be laid
off should that serve the shareholders' interests. Bondholders are in a similar
position with respect to corporate actions that increase the riskiness of their
investments. Restrictions on shareholder freedom that have not been bargained for by their beneficiaries thus devalue shareholder property rights
unjustly.
An alternative legal regime might assign entitlements to nonshareholders
rather than shareholders, requiring that shareholders bargain and pay for
the right to harm nonshareholders under defined circumstances. Contractarians write as if changing corporate law so as to recognize such entitlements
would be obviously illegitimate. Yet surprisingly little effort is made to
defend the current entitlement regime. The claim that shareholders should
continue to enjoy a property right to harm nonshareholders incidentally to
their pursuit of profit maximization seems at times
to rest on nothing more
34
than a reflexive commitment to the status quo.
More seriously, one might argue that shareholders should enjoy this
right because they value it more highly than nonshareholders would value
a property right not to be harmed.31 One response is to question the validity
of the factual assertion. Many nonshareholders lose far more from shareholder exploitation of nonshareholder vulnerability than would shareholders
if such opportunities were impeded. If an entitlement were with nonshareholders, shareholders would presumably sustain a somewhat lower rate of
return on their investments (unless job security and other protections actually
resulted in heightened productivity). In contrast, as long as the entitlement
is with the shareholders, workers, for example, are vulnerable to the loss
of their jobs and attendant human capital investments, to the prospect of
potentially lengthy unemployment or inferior reemployment, and to the
morale costs generated by insecurity. It seems reasonable to assume that
workers would value ex ante protection more highly than would shareholders
36
value a right to harm.

33. See, e.g., William J. Carney, Does Defining ConstituenciesMatter?, 59 U. CN. L.
REV. 385 (1990); Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital Investments, and
the Legal Treatment of Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1989 DuKE L.J. 173; James J.
Hanks, Jr., Playing with Fire: NonshareholderConstituency Statutes in the 1990s, 21 STmSoN
L. REv. 97 (1991); DeBow & Lee, supra note 20.
34. As a legal argument, the objection to tampering with the status quo is weak in the
corporate law context. Taking the cue from Justice Story's opinion in Trustees of Dartmouth
College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518 (1819), state corporate statutes routinely include provisions
reserving the power of amendment and announcing their appicabilty to corporations formed
prior to amendment. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 394 (1974) (1991 rep. vol.).
35. For discussion of this general approach to the assignment of entitlements, see RICHARD
A. POSNER, EcONoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 445-47 (3d ed. 1986).
36. One might question whether the entitlement assignment question has any practical
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Even if the current entitlement assignment can be justified on efficiency

grounds, communitarians find that justification insufficient. At best the
market-based approach simply produces an outcome that registers existing
inequalities of wealth and bargaining capability. 37 Nonshareholder protection
from the costs associated with shareholder profit maximization is assumed
to depend on relative willingness and ability to pay contractual guarantees.

Should job security or compensation for abrupt layoff, for example, depend
entirely on the ability to pay? The force of the market-based argument for

the legal status quo rests ultimately on the legitimacy of the existing
distributional context, an argument that contractarian corporate law scholars
have not made.
Contractarians base their claim that communitarian corporate law threatens shareholders' property rights on the current but historically contingent

property rights regime. To the extent contractarians justify this regime by
reference to the market, communitarians respond by rejecting the view that
the market should provide the answer to all questions about the assignment
of legal entitlements. Again, under 38some circumstances, people are entitled
to more than they can bargain for.
importance. If transaction costs were minimal, efficient outcomes would emerge either way.
For example, if shareholders value a particular large-scale layoff more than the affected
workers value retaining their jobs, the layoff would represent a more efficient allocation of
resources than would continuation of the existing situation. Shareholders will either bring
about the layoff, or, if the entitlement is with the workers, the shareholders will pay the
workers an amount equal to or greater than the value of their jobs but less than the value to
the shareholders of the layoff. See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. &
ECON. 1 (1960). In real life of course, transaction costs often are significant; it is therefore
possible that the workers in our example may value their jobs more than the shareholders
value the layoff but, if the entitlement is with the shareholders, workers may nevertheless be
vulnerable because of the practical difficulties involved in bargaining for protection. Further,
regardless of efficiency considerations, assignment of the entitlement has important distributional implications. Assignment to shareholders puts the burden on nonshareholders to bargain
and pay for any protections from shareholder harm. Security therefore depends on the ability
to identify and specify in advance the kinds of protection that are needed and the circumstances
under which they should apply-and on the ability to pay for them. Failure leaves nonshareholders vulnerable to shareholders to the full extent of the failure, because the default is
allowance of shareholder wealth maximization regardless of harms to nonshareholders. In
contrast, assignment to nonshareholders of a legal right to protection would require that
shareholders bargain and pay for the opportunity to inflict losses on nonshareholders under
the circumstances defined by the nonshareholders' property rights. Under one entitlement
regime, nonshareholders must pay for whatever protections they are to enjoy, and bear the
risk of incomplete specification; under the other, nonshareholders are entitled to compensation
for harm regardless of bargain.
37. In fact, it seems possible that this approach actually exacerbates existing distributional
inequalities. Transaction costs and other bargaining difficulties (such as the burden on nonshareholders to specify ex ante the parameters of protection) that impede nonshareholder selfprotection facilitate corresponding gains for shareholders. Further, to the extent that nonshareholders can obtain protection, ignorance about the future may lead them to purchase protection
that is broader than necessary. Overpayment increases existing wealth inequalities.
38. Ironically, assignment of the property right in question to shareholders on the ground
that they would be willing to pay more for it than would nonshareholders gives shareholders
the benefit of that imaginary bargain but relieves them of any duty actually to pay for it.
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Communitarians awat a persuasive argument for the proposition that
the market alone should govern questions like the respective rights of
shareholders and various nonshareholder constituencies in corporate governance matters. Contractarians often seem to assume that the burden is on
the communitarians to justify an alternative approach to corporate law. Yet
one could readily respond that it is the contractarians who ought to justify
their insistence on a relentless commitment to market-defined outcomes.
References to efficiency simply beg the underlying question of why efficiency
should provide the sole normative criterion. As a society, we have not
embraced the market as a totalizing model for the definition of rights and
responsibilities. We have not even done that with respect to all of the
questions that arise in the course of corporate pursuit of shareholder wealth.
Those who see legal intervention in corporate governance relationships as
unjust wealth reallocations should not assume that their notion of injustice
is so obviously correct as to obviate any need for elaboration, and justification.
The communitarian position with respect to nonshareholder entitlements
thus does not rest on an essentially empirical disagreement over the extent
of externalities and the technological feasibility of contractual protection.
Communitarians reject the view that nonshareholder protections should be
limited to those they can bargain for or would bargain for but for prohibitive
transactions costs. (The refusal to accept actual bargaining capability as the
relevant benchmark sets communitarians apart from progressive contractarians as well.) Communitarians are instead preoccupied with a different set
of considerations. They seek to redefine the range of interests that corporate
law should view as legitimately entitled to regard, and to develop legal
mechanisms to protect those interests. For communitarians, justice does not
require endorsement of the existing distribution of wealth and bargaining
capability. They seek instead to reform corporate law so as to foster
individual dignity and promote societal welfare.
III.

COMMUNiTAR1AN APPROACHES TO CORPORATE LAW

No one is under any illusion that communitarian corporate law reform
is an easy project. At the very least, communitarians will need to articulate
why corporate law should not continue its focus on shareholder wealth
maximization and leave protection of nonshareholder interests for other
legal regimes (e.g., labor and employment law) with their own particular
constituencies. However normatively deficient the contractarian defense of
the traditional shareholder primacy model may be, at least that model has
the virtue of a relatively narrow focus. One response would emphasize the
corporation as the arena in which the various interests of shareholders and
nonshareholders encounter each other. If one discards the view that bargaining is sufficient to mediate among those interests, reform of the rules
structuring corporate governance presents an opportunity to develop rational, well-considered regulation of relations among shareholders and nonshareholders. Perhaps supplemented by public law interventions, this approach
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seems preferable to a number of uncoordinated, ad hoc reform efforts, in
various discrete areas of the law, that ignore the need for systematic
balancing of shareholder and nonshareholder interests.
If corporate law is to move beyond exclusive concern for shareholders,
some will seek to develop a new theoretical foundation upon which a new
body of doctrine can be erected. Even those who are content to take a
more local approach, focusing on particular, tangible problems rather than
general abstractions of doubtful determinacy, must face difficult questions
of fact and value. Questions like these are a far cry from the apparently
elegant, assertedly scientific, and narrowly shareholder-centric assertions of
the corporate law contractarians' economic approach. By moving corporate
law away from its traditional focus on the shareholder/management accountability problem, the communitarian project openly addresses political
questions and demands judgments that contractarians often seem to believe-incorrectly, of course-to be avoidable.3 9 Contractarians too push a
political vision. They simply do not bother to speak about it in those terms.
If they do, they will encounter many of the same kinds of challenges now
confronting the communitarians.
Those who say that communitarians have not yet articulated a fully
developed alternative agenda are correct. Much of the effort over the past
few years has been in the form of negative critique of shareholder primacy,
particularly its radical manifestation during the hostile takeover controversy.
Communitarians are now turning their attention toward a positive agenda,
but so far their numbers are few and the project is still in its early daysA0
It is possible to discern some of the directions this project could continue
to take in the years to come. One avenue that has already received attention
is the use of corporate law to promote stable relations between certain
nonshareholder constituencies and the corporation. Additionally, corporate
law may have a role to play in the adjustment among shareholders and
nonshareholders of gain-sharing. It might also attend to questions of fairness
in the apportionment of transition costs as the economy moves through the

39. Thus, aside from their fundamental ideological differences, a further, perhaps equally
fundamental, difference divides the two camps. Contractarians often seem psychologically
predisposed against the kind of openly normative and political, and therefore unavoidably
untidy and controversial, questions that communitarians insist must be addressed.
• 40. Even so, communitarians have generated concrete law reform proposals. For example,
Professor O'Connor has argued for legal protections within the corporate law framework for
employees. See Marleen A. O'Connor, The Human CapitalEra: Reconceptualizing Corporate
Law to FacilitateLabor-Management Cooperation,78 CoRNELL L. REa. 899 (1993); O'Connor,
supra note 23. Professor Mitchell has advocated protections for bondholders, and also more
far-reaching governance reforms. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, supra note 23; Professor Mitchell,
A CriticalLook at CorporateGovernance, 45 VAND. L. REv. 1263 (1992). Professors Millon
and Mitchell and Steve Wallman have suggested interpretive strategies for the new directors'
duty statutes. See David Millon, supra note 10; Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and
PracticalFramework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEx. L. REV. 579
(1992); Steven M.H. Wallman, The ProperInterpretation of Corporate Constituency Statutes
and Formulation of DirectorDuties, 21 STEnSoN L. Rv. 163 (1991).
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jarring transformations ahead. As it does in Europe, corporate law might
facilitate participation in decisionmaking by those most directly affected by

particular kinds of decisions. Employee ownership structures are yet a
further possibility.
To date, much communitarian law reform scholarship has focused on
a "multifiduciary" model, according to which management's duty is redefined to embrace nonshareholder as well as shareholder interests. This work
has sought to suggest ways in which the otherwise frustratingly vague
directors' duty statutes might be interpreted so as to serve communitarian
ends. 4' However, no one has suggested that the multifiduciary model provides a complete reform package. While this model may seem to be gaining
broad support among communitarians and others, it is important to appreciate that it is not the only-or necessarily the best 42-available alternative.
Some wish to explore a different approach, one based on democracy and
self-governance rather than paternalism and dependence implicit in a fiduciary model.
The ideological and psychological predispositions that turn many corporate law scholars away from these kinds of inquiries explain the inability
of at least some contractarians to acknowledge the existence of a crisis in
corporate law. 43 Like voting rights and derivative suit enforcement of
fiduciary duties before them, takeovers failed to provide shareholders with
salvation from managerial irresponsibility. Now attention turns hopefully
to institutional investors, and doctrinal tinkering with the shareholder primacy model proceeds apace. From this perspective, corporate law is an

41. See Millon, supra note 10; Mitchell, Theoretical and Practical Framework for
Enforcing CorporateConstituency Statutes, supra note 40; O'Connor, supra note 23; Wallman,
.supra note 40.
42. Critics repeatedly point to the accountability (or agency cost) problems that this
model replicates and perhaps exacerbates. There may be something to be said for these
arguments, though one communitarian response might be that agency costs are part of the
price to be paid for communitarian benefits.
43. For example, a recent collection of articles intended for use as a supplement to
standard corporate law casebooks ambitiously claims to reveal "the foundations of corporate
law" but contains nothing but articles by neoclassically-oriented economists and more-or-less
doctrinaire contractarian law professors employed at elite law schools. The book ignores
entirely the scholarship of the communitarians (or the progressive contractarians), as well as
the larger political controversy over corporate law's appropropriate objectives that is currently
taking place. See THE FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE LAW (Roberta Romano ed., 1993). It is
not hard to see why elite law school professors for the most part consciously ignore the
evidence (in the form of judicial and legislative developments and academic scholarship that
reject shareholder primacy) of a crisis in corporate law. Elite law school academicians look to
each other for professional esteem, rather than to others outside their circle. These scholars
all take shareholder primacy more or less for granted, and most of them appear to be more
or less wedded to the political value judgments that underlie the neoclassical economic approach
(i.e., contractarian) to corporate law. In this environment, one does not score points with the
people who count by paying attention to scholarship produced by outsiders, let alone by using
one's time to engage it. The opportunity cost of doing so would be neglect of the problems
that have been identified as worthy of serious attention. Currently at the top of that list is
institutional shareholder activism in its various dimensions.
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ongoing quest for the holy grail of shareholder wealth maximization. Like
Mr. Micawber, hope springs eternal that, if only we are patient and look
hard enough, "something will turn up." The communitarians' belief that
corporate law might be used to improve the quality of people's lives beyond
what they can bargain for seems irrelevant to the contractarian task at
hand. Efforts by legislatures and courts to move away from the old
shareholder primacy orthodoxy are assumed to be the product of political
expediency rather than a broadly based, self-conscious rejection of the legal
economists' attempts to justify an extreme antiregulatory shareholder primacy regime. Recent challenges to shareholder primacy appear to be no
different from the short-lived "corporate social responsibility" debate of
the early 1970s, which left no lasting impact on corporate law. There is no
crisis, just some minor perturbations that have, at best. (or worst), only
temporarily sidetracked corporate law from its shareholder-centered orbit.
The endless quest-endless both because no legal solution is ever perfect
and also because our society never has- committed itself, and never will, to
relentless shareholder wealth maximization and its attendant social coststo solve the shareholder/management accountability problem continues as
if nothing really new has happened.
One should not interpret the contractarians' parochial indifference toward recent communitarian developments as indicating their genuine triviality. The shareholder primacy model continues to command respect, especially
among mainstream academicians and self-proclaimed "shareholders' rights"
advocates, but the search for communitarian alternatives enjoys broad
support in political as well as academic arenas. Neither position is on the
verge of imminent triumph over the other. And, given the depth of disagreement, it should come as no surprise that no realistic possibility of
compromise has yet emerged. For too many people, the traditional shareholder primacy model has outlived its utility and now threatens important
values.. The crisis is here, and we should expect it to continue.
In light of the magnitude of the task confronting the communitarians,
attention to traditional legal sources, however necessary, is unlikely to
provide sufficient creative inspiration. Just as the defenders of shareholder
primacy have successfully turned to neoclassical economics and finance
theory, so too communitarians may benefit from interdisciplinary inquiry.
The threshhold task of calling for that broader view is the occasion for this
symposium. As legal academicians engaged in normative discourse, we will
always have much to learn from our colleagues in the humanities and social
sciences. This conference brings together a number of corporate law scholars-mostly, though by no means exclusively, of communitarian bent-to
consider the thoughts of three nonlawyers on various aspects of corporate
law and activity. We chose three people whose recent work led us to believe
they might have something interesting to say to corporate law academicians:
Alan Wolfe has investigated moral obligation from a sociological perspective, with brilliant results," Karen Newman is engaged in exciting empirical
44. ALAN WOLFE,

VHOsE KEEPER? SociAL SCIENCE AND MORAL OBLIGATION (1989).
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research into justice in the workplace, 45 and Ronald Green turns his philosopher's eye to questions of business ethics in a new and innovative
textbook. 46 Our hope is that these encounters will spark fruitful ideas about
the future of corporate law. And perhaps the nonlawyers will return to
their disciplines stimulated to pursue avenues of inquiry they otherwise
might not have considered. Corporate law is currently in the midst of crisis,
because of the exhaustion of the shareholder primacy model. How we
articulate the nature of that crisis, and the breadth of vision with which we
seek alternative approaches, will help to shape the resolution that will
eventually emerge. The direction that resolution takes is terrifically important. This symposium seeks to make a contribution to that process.

45. Karen L. Newman [Gaertner], The Effect of EthicalClimate on Managers' Decisions,

in

MOaALITY, RATIONALITY, AND EPPCIENCY (R.M. Coughlin
46. RONALD M. GREEN, THE ETHICAL MANAGER (1994).

ed., 1991).
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